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No t hing  Muc h Ha s Ha ppened , but  Lo o k  Wha t ’s Coming  do wn th e Pike 
Rece nt  Dev elo pment s  in Nat ur al  Res ou rce s  Law
BY
Thoma s a . da il y1
Con to rt ionis ts  Hammer  Kais er -Fr a nc is Bef or e 
West er n Okl ah oma  Jur y
Time was when you would rather be sued almost any place but Texas. That 
particular worm appears to have made a U-ey.2 In today’s Texas, no breach of contract, 
no matter how egregious, can be more than a breach of a contract.3 There is no such thing 
as a contort4 in Texas. Unfortunately, that may not be the case in Arkansas or Oklahoma.
During last year’s Natural Resources Law Institute, we discussed the contort 
phenomenon in the context of Seeco, Inc. v. Hales.5 Really, though, it didn’t matter in 
Hales whether the class’ theory was tort, contract or both. All damages awarded were
1 Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Attorneys at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.
2
3 Actually, it took Texas some time to get to where it got. In Pan American Pet. v. 
Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1963), the Texas Court of Appeals actually 
affirmed an award of punitive damages in an implied covenant to prevent drainage case. 
However, a more conservative Texas Supreme Court has since established that if the 
damage would not have occurred without the breach of some contract, the case could be 
brought only in contract. See Dewitt County Electric Coop. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 
1999); Southwestern Bell v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991); Southwestern Bell 
v. Delanney, 809 SW2d 493 (Tex. 1991); Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 
563 (Tex. 1981)
4 When we use the word “contort” we mean a breach of contract, usually intentional, 
which a clever plaintiff's lawyer (the “contortionist”) is able to convert into a tort (frequently 
fraud).
5 341 Ark. 673, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).
based upon actual underpayments of royalty, plus interest on those underpayments. 
Moreover, all of the Hales defendants were corporate affiliates of one another, proven to 
have been alter egos.
This year’s leading contort case is Bridenstine v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Company6 The 
facts are complicated. Beginning in 1978, and continuing throughout the early 1980's, a 
company called Funk Exploration, Inc., drilled and operated numerous gas wells in Beaver 
and Texas Counties, Oklahoma. Those wells were connected to a gathering system built 
by a Funk affiliate, Funk Fuels Corporation. Another affiliate, Funk Liquids Corporation, 
built a gas plant to remove liquids from the gas. Almost from the beginning, Funk 
Exploration paid Funk Fuels a 45¢ per MCF gathering fee. In addition, Funk paid a 
“marketing fee” to a company called Encon. All these fees were deducted prior to payment 
of royalties by Funk.
By 1985 the Funk companies were in severe financial trouble. Whether for that 
reason or otherwise, they all changed their names during that year. Each became a 
Waterford Company.
Also, in order to raise cash, the Funk/Waterford entities sold a major position in the 
wells and the Beaver Pipeline to Ladd Petroleum Corporation. Over the years, through 
corporate changes, Ladd turned into Amax Oil & Gas, Inc., Union Pacific Oil & Gas 
Company, Universal Resources Corporation and, finally, various subsidiaries of Questar 
Corporation.
Meanwhile, Funk/Waterford took bankruptcy. Kaiser-Francis bought the
6 Texas County, Oklahoma, District Court Case No. CJ-2000-1.
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Funk/Waterford entities out of the bankruptcy and merged them into Kaiser-Francis.
Throughout the 1980's and the 1990's, the producing companies, whatever their 
names, continued to deduct 45¢ per MCF for gathering, as well as a “marketing fee.” At 
the end, Kaiser-Francis was paying that marketing fee to Texas Southwest Gas 
Corporation which, by then, had become a subsidiary of Kaiser-Francis. By the end of 
1994, Kaiser-Francis had become the operator of most of the wells.
In 1995, the Bridenstines filed suit on behalf of themselves and a putative class of 
royalty owners against Kaiser-Francis, Union Pacific Oil & Gas Company, Universal 
Resources Company (Questar Exploration & Production Company) and Chase-Manhattan 
Bank (which had benefitted from the liquidation of the Funk/Waterford companies and the 
sale of their assets to Kaiser-Francis and the other defendants). All claims against all 
defendants other than Kaiser-Francis were settled by those defendants in 2000 and early 
2001, leaving Kaiser-Francis as the remaining defendant at the trial.
The class alleged that Kaiser-Francis and the settling defendants were jointly and 
severally liable for non-payment of royalties on the gathering fees, the marketing fees, and 
for gas lost through under measurement. The class’ theory was fraud.7 It claimed that 
royalty check stubs and year-end statements "misrepresented” royalty owners’ shares of 
the gas sale proceeds. The jury agreed. The verdict for actual damages against Kaiser- 
Francis is $54,960,606.30. In addition, the jury awarded punitive damages of 
$18,803,446.85. Kaiser-Francis will almost certainly appeal. However, as we learned from 
Hales, it is difficult to overturn a jury verdict.
7 A tort, or contort.
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The contort aspect of Bridenstine is important for at least two reasons. First, and 
most obvious, is punitive damages. Punitive damages are not available in breach of 
contract actions. On the other hand, if an intentional tort is committed, the jury has the 
power to teach the defendant a lesson (and bestow a windfall upon the plaintiff) with 
punitive damages. $18,803,446.85 is real money which would not have been awarded for 
mere breach of contract.
Second, since these damages were caused by the commission of a tort, Kaiser- 
Francis will be unable to obtain contribution from any of the other defendants, in spite of 
the fact that those defendants appear to have carried off much of the allegedly ill-gotten 
gain. Oklahoma’s statute concerning contribution among joint tortfeasors provides for a 
reduction in liability to the extent of money paid by settling joint tortfeasors but, then, if 
those joint tortfeasors settled in good faith, they are released from any duty to contribute 
to the ultimate verdict.8 This statute applies only to contribution between joint tortfeasors, 
since this legal justification for joint and several liability is based upon tort rather than 
contract principles.
Incidentally, the contribution issue would have turned out differently in Arkansas, 
which has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Under the Uniform 
Act, a joint tortfeasor who settles is not discharged unless the release given him 
proportionately releases all other tortfeasors.9
8 12 O.S. § 832(H).
9 A.C.A. §§ 16-61-204 & 205.
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AOGC Regul a t ion on Seismic  Ac t ivit y Has Unint ended 
Co nseq uenc e in Co l umbia  Co unt y Case
The 1993 Arkansas General Assembly enacted Act No. 242 of that year,10 
authorizing and directing the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (“AOGC” or 
“Commission”) to regulate seismic exploration activities. The Commission responded with 
Rule B-42. That rule provides, in part:
No entry shall be made by the permittee upon the lands upon which such
seismic operations are to be conducted, without the permittee having first
secured a permit from the landowner authorizing such operations to be
conducted.
The regulation does not expressly deal with a situation where a landowner refuses to grant 
a permit despite the seismic operator’s contractual or common-law right of ingress and 
egress to the lands in question.
In 1998, Sonat Exploration Company wanted to conduct seismic operations in 
Columbia County on James Blanchard’s property. Sonat had lease rights to come on the 
land but Mr. Blanchard refused access. Sonat then obtained a restraining order against 
Mr. Blanchard so that it might exercise its lease rights.
Later, in the same consolidated case,11 the Court12 held that Sonat had trespassed 
upon Mr. Blanchard’s land and was liable therefor. The Court’s reasoning was that Sonat 
had violated Rule B-42 by not securing Mr. Blanchard’s permission and was thus a 
trespasser. The case has not been fully adjudicated and so no appeal has yet been taken.
10 A.C.A. § 15-71-114
11 Swift Energy Company and Blanchard, et. al. v. Sonat Exploration Company, 
Columbia Circuit Case No. CIV 98-137-5.
12 The Honorable Larry Chandler.
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It is submitted that the AOGC has no authority to require landowner permission 
under circumstances where a seismic operator already has a legal right to come upon 
lands. As a consequence, Rule B-42, as interpreted by the Blanchard court, appears to 
be an unconstitutional taking of the seismic contractor’s property rights. Moreover, the 
Blanchard result was never intended by the Commission.
The Commission staff has recently proposed a revision to Rule B-42. The offensive 
language would be changed to read:
No entry shall be made by the permittee upon the lands upon which such 
seismic operations are to be conducted without the permittee having first 
given notice as provided in Ark. Code Ann. (1987) § 15-72-20313 to the 
surface owner of the lands upon which such operations are to be conducted.
Meanwhile, an appeal from the Blanchard ruling is a virtual certainty.
Hal es Sa g a  Fina l l y Ends as t he  Ark a nsa s 
Cou rt  of  Appea l s Af fi r ms Dismissa l  
o f  Ratepa yer s ’ Cl a im f o r  Ref und
This space, a year ago, began with a discussion of the infamous Seeco v. Ha/es.14 
As everyone knows, that case affirmed a record jury verdict in favor of a class of royalty 
owners who convinced the jury that they were defrauded when Seeco and its utility affiliate, 
Arkansas Western Gas Company, rewrote Contract 5915 in order to appease the Arkansas 
Public Service Commission and implement a settlement entered into by Arkansas Western, 
the Commission staff and the Arkansas Attorney General’s office.
13 A statute generally requiring notice to be given to the surface owners prior to oil 
and gas exploration.
14 341 Ark. 673, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).
15 A gas purchase contract with ridiculously high prices and take-or-pay obligations.
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Brandon v. Arkansas Western Gas Company16 was a putative class action brought 
in the Public Service Commission, seeking to certify a class of all of AWG’s rate payers 
and claiming entitlement to refunds for the period prior to the reduction in the Contract 59 
gas price. Like Hales, Brandon involved multiple appeals. In a prior appeal,16 7 the Court 
of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ attorneys were not entitled to attorneys’ fees for 
representing the putative class under the common fund doctrine.18
After remand from that first appeal, the Public Service Commission dismissed 
Brandon and Brooks’ complaint, holding that the settlement entered into by Arkansas 
Western, the Commission staff and the Attorney General’s office19 was a res judicata bar 
to further proceedings brought by individual rate payers. The Arkansas Court of Appeals 
affirmed and the Hales saga officially ended on February 7, when the Supreme Court 
denied the Plaintiffs’ petition for review.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Brandon opinion is that Judge Roaf, 
writing for the Court of Appeals, managed to never mention Hales. Actually, Hales is 
distinguishable. While the Attorney General clearly represents rate payers before the 
Public Service Commission, royalty owners are not parties and therefore principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel cannot apply to bar subsequent royalty owner cases.
16 76 Ark. App. 201 , 61 S.W.3d 193 (2001).
17 Brandon v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 67 Ark. App. 140, 992 S.W.2d 
834 (1999).
18 Remarkably, that was not the end of the matter.
19 It was conceded that the Attorney General represented the State of Arkansas and 
all rate payers at that time.
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Ar k a ns a s Court  o f  Appea l s Af fi r ms Holding  
Agai nst  Co -Ten ant ’s Cl a im o f  Adve r se  Po ssessio n
In the 1880's, Augustus and Martha Hopper acquired 120 acres of land in Yell 
County. After Martha’s death, in 1947, one of their children, Lawrence Hopper, was in the 
sole possession of the lands until his own death in 1975. During that time, Lawrence 
exercised many incidents of ownership over the land, including possession, tax payments, 
receiving rents and profits, constructing and maintaining improvements and receiving the 
proceeds from oil and gas leases and timber sales. Lawrence’s son, John Hopper, then 
possessed the land from 1979, when he retired from the Navy, until he discovered, in 
1996, that record title was in his grandparents. He filed suit to quiet title against the rest 
of the family.
The Yell County Chancery Court20 held that Hopper had not sustained his burden 
of proving that his possession was adverse to his co-tenants and granted the other family 
members’ counterclaim for partition of the property. The Arkansas Court of Appeals 
affirmed.21 The lesson here is simple. While it is possible for a co-tenant to adversely 
possess property, mere possession and exercise of incidents of ownership is not enough. 
There must be something which clearly telegraphs the adversity of the possessing co- 
tenant’s intent to oust the rest of the family.
20 Honorable Van B. Taylor.
21 Hopper v. Daniel, 72 Ark. App. 344, 38 S.W.3d 370 (2001).
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Ok l ah o ma  Cou r t  o f  Civil  Appea l s Rul es That  Recei pt  o f  Roy al ti es Fr om 
A Unit  Wel l  Doe s Not  Constitute  Adv er se Pos ses sio n  o f  Minera ls  Under  
Any Tr a c t  Other  Than Tha t  Upon Which t he  Unit  Wel l  Is Physica lly  Located .
As Professor Phillip Norvell taught us in a paper presented to this Institute in 2000,22 
there are a lot of cases which tell what is not adverse possession of severed mineral 
interests. Unfortunately, there are few, if any, holding what is. That said, many of us 
would have guessed that receipt of royalties from a unit well for a period in excess of seven 
years would constitute adverse possession of at least that class of mineral upon which the 
royalties were paid. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals does not agree. In Cornelius 
v. Moody Bible Institute o f Chicago,23 that court held that since the unit well was not 
physically located on the tract in question, receipt of royalties was not adverse possession 
of anything. Apparently, the court would have held otherwise had the well been physically 
located on the tract.
We can only speculate whether the Arkansas court would adopt the Cornelius 
decision. Indeed there is some reason to believe it would not. In Post v. Tenneco Oil 
Company,24 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a lessor’s entitlement to “free gas” from 
wells located on the lease premises included off-premises unit wells. In Post, the Supreme 
Court noted that the unit wells produced gas from under the lease premises and that 
royalties were paid on a unit basis. In an earlier case, Brizzolara v. Powell,25 the Arkansas
22 Norvell, Adve r se  Pos ses sio n and t he Sever ed Miner a l  Est a t e in Ar ka nsas, 
39th Annual Natural Resources Law Institute (2000)
23 18 P.3d 1081 (Ok. Civ. App. 2001).
24 278 Ark. 527, 648 S.W.2d 42 (1983).
25 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949).
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Court held that adjoining production under a voluntary pooling agreement did not constitute
adverse possession of gas but offered the following dicta:
It is possible that the rule might be different if the neighboring well had been 
drilled in accordance with a finding in the Oil and Gas Commission that such 
a well would drain surrounding property, necessitating the formation of a 
drilling unit; but that situation is not presented.26
Ar k a nsa s Cou rt  o f  Appea l s Ho l ds t hat  Use o f  Underground  
Pipe line  Without  Rel a t ed Sur f a c e Acti viti es  Is Not  
Suf fi ciently  Adver se  to  Cr ea t e A Presc riptive  Ease ment
The Whortons and Needhams are neighbors. An Arkla distribution line crosses the
Needhams’ property. Many years before either family had acquired their properties, a
private gas line was laid from the Arkla line to the house now occupied by the Whortons.
The Needhams claimed they were unaware of that line. In 1999, Arkla determined that the
gas line to the Whorton house had developed a leak and cut off the gas. The Whortons,
claiming a prescriptive easement, tried to go upon the Needhams’ property and make
repairs. When the Needhams refused, the Whortons sued, claiming they had a
prescriptive easement. The Logan County Chancery Judge27 ruled for the Needhams and
the Arkansas Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed.28 Mere transmission
of gas beneath the surface does not constitute the adverse possession necessary to create
a prescriptive easement. Only those activities which would call attention to the easement,
such as mowing and maintaining the right-of-way, will suffice.
26 Brizzolara v. Powell, supra, 214 Ark. at 873.
27 The Honorable Van B. Taylor.
28 Whorton v. Needham, No. CA 00-773 (Ark. App. 03/07/2001)
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Ar k a ns a s Leg isl at ur e Def ea t s Bil l  Allo ca ting  
Po st -Pro duction  Co st s Whil e Colora do  Dec isio n 
Demo nstrates  Why Such Leg isl a t io n is Neede d
A landmark case dealing with the deductibility of post-production costs in calculating 
royalty is Mittlestaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,29 which holds that the lessee has a duty, 
under its implied covenant to market, to cause gas to become a marketable product, free 
of any cost to the lessor. Also, it is generally thought that, with or without specific language 
in leases, the place of sale of gas upon which royalty is based, whether actual or 
hypothetical, is at the wellhead where it is produced. Thus, any monies spent enhancing 
the value of marketable gas by treating it, compressing it, and/or moving it to a market 
where a better price is available may properly be shared, proportionately, with the lessor.
However, because of the uncertainty of Arkansas law on this issue,30 Arkansas gas 
industry representatives petitioned the Arkansas legislature to clarify the matter. Fairly late 
in the 2001 Legislative Session, Senator Mahoney introduced Senate Bill 813, which was 
designed to statutorily adopt the Mittlestaedt doctrine and clarify that reasonable 
transportation costs for sales away from the wellhead could be deducted, so as to obtain 
a “net-back” wellhead price for the gas. The bill proved controversial. It finally passed the 
Senate but was defeated in the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile, out in Denver, the Colorado Supreme Court proved why Senate Bill 813 
was so desperately needed. In its case of Rogers v. Westerman,31 the Colorado court got
29 754 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
30 Caused, in large part, by Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 
563 (1968).
31 29 P.3d. 887 (Colo. 2001).
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it about as wrong as it gets. While the court adopted the first marketable product rule of 
Mittlestaedt, it declined to adopt the “at the wellhead” rule, without which the first 
marketable product rule makes no sense.
Instead, the Colorado court held that the lessee’s duty to make a marketable 
product included the cost of transporting the gas to a “commercial marketplace.” Worse, 
the court held that a sale of the gas, regardless of whether it occurred in good faith, did not 
necessarily establish a commercial market. Rather, that question, as well as the question 
of when gas becomes a marketable product, is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
At this point, we should probably note that the sensational Bridenstine case32 was 
a contort involving excessive post-production charges deducted from royalties. It is 
certainly imaginable that, under the Rogers decision, a producer could sell its produced 
gas, pay the appropriate fraction of the proceeds to royalty owners, and still be held liable 
in contort for royalties on the difference between the price gotten and that theoretically 
available at some better “commercial marketplace.” In the worst case scenario, if 
contorting is permitted, a runaway jury might even award punitive damages. Senate Bill 
813, or something like it, needs to be enacted in the next legislative session.
AOGC Implem ent s  Mo st  of  Newl y Auth orized  Inc re ase  
in Oil  a nd Gas Co nser va t io n Asse ssment
The AOGC is financed, in large part, by a severance tax known as the conservation 
assessment. That tax has long been 25 mils (2.5¢) per barrel of oil,33 5 mils (.50) per MCF
32 Discussed supra.
33 A.C.A. § 51-71-107.
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of gas34 and 250 per 1,000 barrels of brine.35 In 2001, the Commission, strapped by 
increased costs, lobbied the legislature for authority to increase these assessments. The 
legislature responded favorably, enacting Act No. 1188 of 2001, which increased its 
authority to tax oil from 25 mils (2.5¢) to 50 mils (5¢) per barrel, gas from 5 mils (.5¢) to 10 
mils (1¢) per MCF and brine from 25¢ to 50¢ per 1,000 barrels.
The Commission staff then conducted a comprehensive review of the relative costs 
of regulating these three industries, versus the conservation assessment paid by each. 
That review led to the staff's conclusion that the brine industry was already paying at least 
its share. However, the staff suggested that the AOGC increase the conservation 
assessments on oil and gas to the maximum amount permitted.
The Commission’s anguish was obvious as it discussed the implementation of its 
increased authority to tax. Indeed, throughout 2001, only one other can contained more 
worms.36 Commissioners appeared to be simultaneously pulled three ways: (1) the need 
for increased revenues was obvious, indeed it was becoming desperate; (2) small South 
Arkansas gas producers demanded no new taxes, at least none that they would have to 
pay;37 (3) North Arkansas gas producers didn’t seem to mind the increase but were 
unwilling to bear more than their proportionate share.
After three separate hearings, the Commission implemented most, but not all, of its
34 Id.
35 A.C.A. § 15-76-306(d).
36 Ducky Wucky, infra.
37 This is somewhat ironic. These folks and their predecessors have long been 
responsible for more than their share of regulatory costs.
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taxing authority on oil and gas. Effective January 1,2002, the conservation assessment 
was increased to 4.3¢ per barrel of oil and .9¢ per MCF of gas. No change was made in 
the brine assessment.
New  Ar k a nsa s Leg isl at io n Co nfir ms Tha t  AOGC May  Employ  Pr iva t e Co unsel
In a 2000 appeal of a Circuit Court affirmance of a 1999 AOGC integration order,38 
the appellants raised an interesting issue. The original act creating the Commission 
provided that legal representation would be by the Attorney General or, if he was not 
available, the prosecuting attorney of any county in which a suit was pending. No mention 
was made of private outside counsel. Thus, the appellants assigned as error the trial 
court’s refusal to disqualify long-time AOGC counsel William Wynne. The Court of 
Appeals dodged that bullet, stating that even if the Circuit Judge’s ruling was erroneous, 
it was harmless error since other counsel in the case had made the identical arguments 
advanced by Mr. Wynne.
This will not be a problem in the future because the Arkansas Legislature enacted 
Act No. 1189 of 2001 which amended A.C.A. § 15-71-104 to read as follows:
15-71-104. Counsel for the commission.
(a) (1) The Oil and Gas Commission may employ an attorney to 
provide specialized professional services in matters requiring legal 
representation.
(2) However, any contract for legal representation shall be subject to 
approval by the Attorney General, who shall otherwise be attorney for the 
commission.
(b) Any member of the commission or the secretary thereof shall
38 Lindquist & Moore v. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, et al., UNPUBLISHED, 
No. CA 99-1306 (Ark. App. 05/31/2000)
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have power to administer oaths to any witness in any hearing, investigation,
or proceeding contemplated by this act or by any other law of this state
relating to the conservation of oil or gas.
History. Acts 1939, No. 105, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 53-104; Acts 2001, No.
1189, § 1.
The Worm s  Got  Out  o f  the  Can Aga in a nd 
Duck y  Wucky  May  Ha ve Lef t  the  Buildi ng
The AOGC has a mixed mission. It is supposed to regulate the production of oil and 
gas to both promote conservation (i.e. prevent waste) and protect correlative rights.39 
Unfortunately, these objectives sometimes are in conflict. In the gas business there are 
at least two commodities worthy of being conserved: gas and money. You can turn money 
into gas and gas into money. Nevertheless, as we all know, these two currencies are not 
always fungible with one another. The exchange rate between them is subject to wild 
fluctuations. Both have a time value. The curves of those time values sometimes run in 
opposite directions.
These variances occur on a case-by-case basis. Some producers are so cash flow 
needy that every decrease in the price of gas must be compensated for by an increase in 
production. At the other extreme are those who look at gas in the ground as money in the 
bank, only better. In between are those producers who would like to sell more gas 
(particularly during periods of high prices) or, at least, not sell less gas as their wells 
deplete.
Of course, correlative rights issues make all of this impossibly complex. Almost 
every drilling unit is differently owned from units off-setting it. Worse, in many units,
39A.C.A. §§ 15-72-101-102
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individual wellbores are owned differently. Against this back-drop, the AOGC has once 
again been asked to deal with the “I words.”40
The last time this happened this author felt compelled to devote an entire paper to 
the resultant can of worms.41 You might remember Ducky Wucky.42 According to the late 
AOGC chairman, Ned Price, fear of all suggestions of increased density was the equivalent 
of screaming “the sky is falling” with each dropping acorn. Well, Ducky found relief in late 
1995 in the form of an interim legislative committee which ordered the AOGC to stop 
studying increased density until it (the committee) could look further into the matter. As far 
as is known that committee never did. Its members have long been lost to term limits. 
Nevertheless, the committee sent increased density into about a six year coma.
During those six years a couple of interesting things happened. First, as might be 
expected, the Arkoma Basin became even more mature. It has become harder and harder 
to find anything new, except in small, hard to find and harder to map reservoirs. Second, 
for a wonderful eighteen months or so, the price was up. Way up! That set off a wave 
of exploration in the south part of the Basin, which is much deeper structurally than the 
“Fairway” along the Arkansas River.
The geology of this South Flank area is somewhat different from the Fairway. The
40 Increased well density.
41 Daily, Inc re as ed  Dens ity  f o r  Ar k an s as  o r  Yo u  Ca n ’t  Keep a  Go o d  Wo r m Do w n  
in t h e Ca n , 34th Annual Natural Resources Law Institute (1995).
42Wucky, a/k/a Lucky, was one of several barnyard residents led into mass panic by 
Chicken Little in the children’s story named for the latter fowl. Little, a creature of limited 
experience, had confused a falling acorn with Armageddon. In at least some versions of 
the story, Little, Wucky and their companions were eaten by one Foxy Loxy, a/k/a Woxy, 
which may explain Wucky’s recent absence from the scene.
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productive sandstones are Middle Atokan. They are deep water turbidites rather than 
deltaic shelf deposits. The communication throughout these strata is tortuous, at best. 
Also, permeability is frequently poor. Finally, the proximity of the South Flank to the 
upthrust Ouachita Mountain Range causes these Middle Atoka reservoirs to be busted up 
with numerous thrust faults. Middle Atoka structure and isopach maps look like scrambled 
eggs.
In recognition of these geologic distinctions the AOGC has begun to recognize that 
South Flank units may need different well density rules. This has been done, case-by- 
case, in one of three ways:
1. Make it easier to establish separation. Existing rules do not prohibit second 
and subsequent wells within units. They prohibit multiple wells within the same “common 
source of supply” within any single unit. Thus, there can always be as many wells as there 
are geologic formations producing within the unit and, if one of those is interrupted by a 
barrier, such as a fault, as many more wells as there are barriers. The only trouble is that 
you have to prove the separation of the reservoir after spending the money to drill your 
well. In two South Flank fields, Chismville and Booneville, the AOGC has agreed that one 
Middle Atoka reservioir, the Upper Borum, is so irregularly deposited and fractured that 
each new well completed in that formation is presumed to be in a separate common source 
of supply from any other Upper Borum wells within the unit.43
2. Reduce the size of the box. Almost all Arkoma Basin units are 640 acre regular 
governmental sections. However, in two instances, the AOGC has somewhat reluctantly
43 AOGC Order Reference Nos. 93-94 and 86-2001-05, respectively.
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agreed to the creation of sub-units within existing units for Middle Atoka wells. In the first 
of these Howard Bagby convinced the Commission to downsize one unit within the 
Chismville Field to 80 acre sub-units.44 The downsizing order applies only to two Middle 
Atoka formations.45 To honor the vested rights of royalty owners all royalties from all sub-
unit wells continue to be paid across the original 676.71 acre unit.
The second successful downsizing did not occur until October 2001. That was a 
rehearing of the previously stalemated application of Vastar Resources, Inc., to reduce unit 
size for a formation called the “Upper Hartford ‘A’” in Mansfield Field to 160 acres. Again, 
the proposal was to create sub-units and continue to pay royalties based upon the original 
units of approximately 640 acres.46
That application proved extremely controversial. It was first heard in September with 
Commissioners Weiser and Carmel absent. At the end of that day there was a tie vote, 
Commissioner White abstaining. Vastar requested a rehearing. That time, with all 
Commissioners participating, it passed, but by only one vote, and was significantly limited 
in scope.47
3. Stripper Wells Should Not Count. Dorsey Ryan has long cried for an exception 
to what he calls the “rule of one.” That exception would classify marginal wells as “stripper” 
wells and permit them to produce without preempting the unit allowable for their productive
44 The unit is Section 7, Township 6 North, Range 27 West, Logan County. The 
case is AOGC Order Reference No. 53-95.
45 Basham (970' to 1,605') and Nichols (1,605' to 2,400').
46 AOGC Order Reference No. 163-2001-10.
47 One year or 10 wells, whichever comes first.
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reservoirs. Dorsey has filed such an application at lease twice before on behalf of Hanna 
Oil and Gas Company. In February, 2002, Dorsey filed another such application, this time 
for Hanna and five other companies.48 The application defines a “stripper” well as a well 
incapable of producing in excess of 60 MCF per day, whose production cannot reasonably 
be improved. It requests that the stripper be permitted to produce without affecting the unit 
production allowable for any other unit well.
Dorsey’s current application is very much like the ones which have failed in the 
past, with one important exception. The latest application is limited to the South Flank of 
the Basin.49 As of the publication date for this paper no opposition50 had surfaced. The 
application is scheduled to be heard the day before this paper is scheduled to be 
presented. It should be interesting.
48 Hogback Exploration, Inc., Klabzuba Oil & Gas, Providence Exploration & 
Production, Inc., Freedom Energy Inc. and XTO Energy, Inc.
49 Chismville, Gragg, Slaytonville, Booneville, Brock Creek, Delaware, Excelsior, 
Fletcher Creek, Mansfield, Pine Ridge, Waveland and Witcherville Fields.
50 Ducky Wucky or otherwise.
Page -19-
